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THE MORALITY
OF SITUATION ETHICS t
AIDAN M. CARR, O.F.M. CONY., S.T.D., S.T.M., J.C.D.*
N VARYING DEGREES of explicitness, sometimes crudely and sometimes
with the most exquisite refinement of tongue or pen, in the world of
flesh and blood and in the world of philosophy and literature, men have
expressed the sentiment that man is not bound, Prometheus-like, by
the bonds of immutable principles governing human behavior.
If these men happened to believe in God and in the validity of
conscience, then they declared that God would directly illumine them
as to what course they should pursue if a decision with moral implica-
tions presented itself to them; no abstract principles and no universal
law would then be necessary. If these men did not happen to believe
in God, then they declared that what some call "a body of ultimate
principles of morality" is merely a catch-phrase; a socially-constructed
chimera devoid of any value except what expediency might accord it.
As such, moral principles would have no genuine sanction if an indi-
vidual should choose to violate them.
Others, without bothering their heads to dispute much at all about
the existence of 'moral norms, even granting them some sort of spectral
existence, have concluded that such principles are too remote from
the practical exigencies of human living to offer any helpful solution
when choices had to be made. At worst, such norms are unworkable;
at best they are easily disregarded hints. "Human nature," "the natural
law," "the dictates of right reason," "the Creator's demands upon His
creatures," "the teachings of Christ's Church," "the example of Christ"
- all these are too rarefied for the mart and the forum. The concretized
tReprinted from the Proceeding of the Catholic Theological Society of America.
*Vice Rector, St. Anthony-on-Hudson.
realities of man's life find precious little
aid in anything so ethereal. The dichotomy
of this now-to-be-performed action and any
extra-mundane law is unbridgeable.
However differentiated and however so
subtle the formulas in which the doctrine
may be cast, all such approaches to the
problems of man's moral life fall within
the classification of Situation Ethics. The
only way to find a trail through life's jungle
is to hack it out with the machete of
subjectivism, step by step. The urgency,
the anguish and the perplexities which form
the warp and woof of man's mortal experi-
ence allow of no other mode. Little wonder
that Pope Pius X1I said that there are
few dangers so great or so heavy in fore-
boding as those which this "new morality"
creates for faith.'
Situation Ethics is a more refined thing
than antinomianism. The latter says, in
effect, that the believer in it can do no
wrong because everything he does is, quoad
eum, sinless. Anything goes - for him.
Msgr. Ronald Knox quotes a conversation
carried on between an eighteenth century
antinomian and a disciple of Wesley.
"Have you a right to all the women in
the world?" asks the Wesleyan. "Yes,"
replied the other, "if they consent." "And
is not that a sin?" exclaims the shocked
Protestant. "Yes," returns the sinless one,
"to him that thinks it is a sin, but not to
those whose hearts are free. ''2
This is the attitude of one who affirms
a belief in the existence of moral laws of
universal validity, but who has argued him-
self into the conviction that he is above
and beyond them. There is no need for
him to fret about such paltry things as
144 ACTA.APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 419 (1952).
2 KNox, ENTHusIAsM 465 (1950).
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transgressions of those laws. He is so per-
fect that he is freed from such narrow
constrictions.
Things are not so simple for the situa-
tionalist. While he does share the indi-
vidualist's mentality with the antinomian,
he lacks the latter's easy assurance that
he has no decision to make; no issue to
face. One who accepts situation morality
as a way of life has always some sense of
responsibility: to God if he is theistic; to
himself and to existence if he is atheistic.
An example of how artful theistic Situa-
tion Ethics can become received a classic
demonstration a few years ago. It appeared
in connection with an effort to justify mari-
tal onanism by appeal to subjectivity and
circumstance.
The proponents of this attempt began by
pointing out that due to changed conditions
of modern society, the married Catholic
individual might well find himself in a
position wherein contraception would not
be wrong. How so? Well, the argument
goes, while fully admitting the truth of the
Redemption and the fact of salvation or
loss of one's soul, nevertheless this par-
ticular married person finds it both impos-
sible to remain continent and impossible,
for some extrinsic reason, to have any (or
any more) children.
This person does not, in theory at least,
deny the existence of objective morality.
His Catholic faith and his reason compel
him to acknowledge, speculatively, that
there is an ideal of behavior in these mat-
ters. Observance of this ideal, when pos-
sible, even leads one to higher perfection.
Face to face with this ideal, with this body
of norms of the moral order, the individual
who is thus caught up in the vortex of his
perplexity and his tensions, admits to him-
SITUATION ETHICS
self that he is at grips with something
bigger than himself.
He may simply mold morality to his own
likeness and proudly feel that what he does
cannot be wrong precisely because he does
it. This, allow the exponents of the doctrine
in question, is a false subjectivism. But,
if one is blessed with a genuine sense of
Christian humility, he will admit that he is
objectively a sinner but not subjectively
one. He remembers that God loves him and
so his objective "sins" are swallowed up
in the greatness of God's love. It is a con-
frontation, immediate and intuitive, be-
tween the "I" of man and the "I" of God.3
This is a rank sentimentalism which
effectively denies the existence of the moral
law, emasculating it of any force it should
have vis-A-vis a difficult moral situation.
What is of itself opposed to morality and
the divine law, ceases to be subjectively
imputable if the law becomes, because
of circumstances, allegedly impossible of
observance.
The Church Speaks
Aside from more or less implicit re-
provals of errors in this field to be found
in the writings of the Fathers4 and in the
Church Councils,5 it has remained for our
times to see several explicit condemnations
of Situation Ethics by the Apostolic See.
Within a few months after his elevation
to the Chair of Peter, Pope Pius XII wrote
in the encyclical Summa Pontificatus: "It is
well established that the first and profound
source of the evils by which the modern
state is afflicted, issues from this fact, that
3 Cf. Changements de perspectives en morale con-
jugale, REVUE EUCHARISTIQUE DU CLERGE 457
(1950).
4 Cf. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, bk. 19, c. 14.
5 Cf. DENZINGER-BANNWART, EucHImIDION SYM-
BOLORUM Nos. 473-74 (1928).
the universal standard of morality is denied
and rejected, not only in the private lives
of individuals but also in the state it-
self. . . ."0 In Humani generis7 the Pontiff
condemned the works and pomps of "a
new erroneous philosophy" under the name
"existentialism" and concerned only with
the existence of individual things, neglecting
their immutable essences.
In March, 1952, addressing a group of
Italian Catholic Action, the Sovereign Pon-
tiff spoke on one of the chief concerns of
modern educators: the struggle for the rec-
ognition of the natural law and its moral
implications in the human coinscience. The
Pope reminded his audience that the divine
norm is the ultimate and personal rule for
deciding, in particular cases, what will con-
stitute a moral action. A man's internal
and external acts, freely chosen by him,
must conform to the, will and command-
ments of Christ. Opposed to this traditional
doctrine is the belief of those who desire
to liberate consciences from the "sophistic
subtleties of casuistry" in order to bring
the moral law back to its original form.
In this way, the moral law will be left
simply to the intelligence and determina-
tion of each one's individual conscience.
By leaving all ethical criteria up to the
individual this "new morality" would dis-
rupt the very foundations of liberty. It
would make every man's conscience some-
thing jealously closed up within itself; the
absolute master of its own decisions. This
"individualist autonomy" affirms that, in-
stead of encouraging the law of human
liberty and love, instead, of insisting on it
as the driving force in man's moral life,
the Church appeals almost exclusively (and
0 31 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIs 423 (1939).
7 42 AcTA APOSTOLICAE SEDiS 561-77 (1950).
with excessive rigidity) to the firmness and
intransigence of Christian moral laws.8
Less than a month later, the Holy Father
again assailed the "new morality" in an'
address to an international congress meet-
ing in Rome.9 This allocution took a crys-
tallized form with regard to Situation
Ethics and it clearly presaged a not-too-
distant formal condemnation of the error.
It was the Pope's express intention to un-
cover the hidden sources of this erroneous
concept of Christian morals.
The Pope referred to reports that many
young persons, confusing Christianity with
a code of precepts and prohibitions, feel
that they are suffocating in a climate of
moral imperative, and are consequently
throwing off the "cumbersome baggage" of
traditional morality in favor of "ethical
existentialism," "ethical actualism," "ethi-
cal individualism," all to be understood as
identified with "morality according to situa-
tions." The distinctive mark of this mo-
rality, explained the Pontiff, is that it is not
based on universal moral laws such as the
Ten Commandments, but on the real and
concrete conditions in which men must act,
and according to which the conscience of
the individual must judge and choose. Each
judgment relates itself to a state of things
which is unique; applicable only once for
every human action. For this reason, any
decision made by the conscience cannot be
commanded by principles or universal laws.
This system of ethics may not always
deny moral concepts and principles, but it
relegates them to the periphery of impor-
tance, away from the center of pertinent
consideration. "It may indeed happen,"
admit the disciples of Situation Ethics,
8 44 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 274 (1952).
9 id. at 413-19.
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"that the determination of conscience will
be in harmony with universal moral norms."
But this is not at all because the universal
principles provide a body of premises from
which conscience, by a reasoning process,
may draw conclusions in a particular case,
always "unique."
At the center of the situation moralist's
decision of conscience is found some "good"
which must be actuated or conserved; this
good is the thing of real and personal
value; this good is what must be considered
the decisive norm ruling any concrete moral
judgment. For example, in the area of faith,
the good is the personal link which binds
us to God. If the seriously formed con-
science, therefore, decides that abandoning
the Catholic religion and joining another
Church will bring one closer to God, then
this step would be justified, even if, gen-
erally speaking, such a move is termed a
defection. Again, in the domain of in-
ter-personal relationships, the mutual gift
of themselves, physically and spiritually,
among young people, is a further example.
In this case, the seriously formed con-
science might decide that, because of a
sincere mutual attraction, intimacies per-
mitted solely between married persons are
also here allowed. Such an "open" con-
science reaches this decision because it
believes that in the hierarchy of values the
one which is primordial is the "personality
value." Being superior, this one will prop-
erly make use of the inferior values of body
and sense according to the suggestion of
each situation. Such choices perfect per-
sonality value, and even though they may
seem to be contrary to divine precepts, the
sincere and seriously formed conscience
which makes these choices takes precedence
over precepts and laws in the eyes of God.
The decision of such a conscience is there-
SITUATION ETHICS
fore "active" and "productive," not "pas-
sive" and "receptive" in relation to God's
natural and positive law.
This new ethics, adapted to circum-
stances, explained the Pope in his allocu-
tion, is eminently "individual." In the
determination of conscience, each individ-
ual finds himself immediately confronted
with God, and on the basis of this immedi-
ate relationship the individual man makes
his decisions without any intervention what-
soever of law, of authority, of religion. God
is thus not the God of law; He is God the
Father with Whom man ought to unite him-
self in filial love. What God requires, main-
tains the theistic situationalist, is right
intention and sincerity; He is not concerned
with the action done. Since it does not
really matter what one does, it follows that
divorce, abortion, bad marriage, refusal of
obedience to lawful authority - all these
(and more besides) are fitting for a man
who has achieved his maturity. If he hap-
pens to be a Christian, these acts would
not be out of harmony with the filial rela-
tionship to a loving Father in heaven.
This convenient subjectivism spares one
the need to ask himself, at any given mo-
ment, whether the decision he is about to
make squares with law or with abstract
norms and rules. Further, it spares him the
hypocrisy of a pharisaical fidelity to laws;
it spares him from pathological scrupulo-
sity; it spares him from levity or lack of
conscience. How so? Because this subjec-
tivism makes the entire responsibility before
God rest upon the Christian personally.
Moral evaluation can be derived only from
the terms of that personal relationship.
Decree of Holy Office
In view of what was said by the Sovereign
Pontiff on previous occasions, it is not sur-
prising that the Sacred Congregation of the
Holy Office condemned Situation Ethics
nominatim by a formal decree early in
1956.10
This document observed that the "new
morality" has insinuated itself even among
Catholics, despite the fact that it is contrary
to moral doctrines as taught and applied by
the Catholic Church. Situation Ethics rests
not upon principles of objective ethics
rooted in being itself, but rather it claims
to transcend the limitation of objectivity.
Promoters of the system maintain that the
ultimate and decisive norm of human activ-
ity is not some objective order of right,
determined by the law of nature and cer-
tainly known in virtue of that law. Rather,
they assert that the correct rules of moral
action lie in some intimate light and judg-
ment rooted in the mind of each individual
person. This subjective intimation enables
one who is placed in a particular concrete
situation to determine for himself what he
is morally obliged to do in each hic et nunc
case. There is no dependence on any im-
mutable rule of action external to man; there
is no measure of truth and rectitude beyond
oneself; man suffices for his own moral
guide.
The devotees of Situation Ethics do not
accord any value to the traditional concept
"human nature," except perhaps as some-
thing relative and mutable existing in this
individual person in these individual cir-
cumstances. As a corollary, the concept
"natural law" is of the same mere relative
worth. Many things which are called abso-
lute postulates of the natural law are, in
point of fact, rooted in existential human
nature. Fortified by this doctrine of the
10 48 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIs 144-45 (1956).
total adaptability of all principles to any
challenge in one's moral life, a man is no
longer conscience-bound by objective law.
By a kind of intuitive and personalized light,
ethical problems that until now seemed
virtually insoluble are susceptible of ready
solution. In this way, one is freed from
bothersome and perplexing moral dilemmas.
The Congregation of the Holy Office
proscribed this Situation Ethics, by what-
ever name it may be called, and interdicted
its being taught in Catholic schools or its
being propagated or defended in books,
writings of any kind or in conferences.
Basic Errors as Sources
The fundamental philosophical error in
Situation Ethics is Existentialism, which
either prescinds from God's interest in
moral matters, or denies His existence, or
falsely interprets His role in the evaluation
of man's acts. In any case the leitmotiv of
this error is a distorted exaltation of sub-
jectivism; a species of morality that works
on the "do-it-yourself" formula. Since the
decree of the Holy Office mentions, more or
less directly, Modernism and Illuminism, in
addition to Existentialism, we shall briefly
examine these errors in relation to Situation
Ethics, as well as Kantianism and Pragma-
tism.
Modernism, especially in its atheistic or
at least agnostic flavor, restricts human
reason so rigidly to phenomena that man's
intellectual processes cannot transcend the
ambit of closed natural causality. Some
Modernists, however, while not repudiating
divinity, nevertheless view man's relation-
ship to God in terms of man's need to think
his faith out "on his own." Faith is therefore
built up on personal experience in such wise
that personal consciousness and revelation
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have interchangeable meanings. Such an
attitude, subjective to the core, is fertile
breeding ground for Situation Ethics. For it
maintains that dogmatic symbola, and hence
any moral principles deduced from them
are, in virtue of "vital immanence," unstable
and in flux."
That man should strive to live his moral
life in blithe reliance on some quasi-mystical
(or rather, pseudo-mystical) interior illu-
mination is no Johnny-come-lately on the
stage of heresy. A kind of Illuminism can be
detected as early as the rigoristic Montanist
movement in the second century.12 In the
sense in which the Holy Office relates it to
Situation Ethics, Illuminism flowered in
the eighteenth century as a philosophico-
religious current, particularly in England,
France, Germany and Italy. It developed
along the lines of Humanism and the pri-
vate-judgment doctrine of Lutheranism,
affirming the autonomy of the will in the
field of morals: neither the laws of religion
nor of the state are sources of morality.
Man's sole guide is his individual conscience
operating under a kind of instinct- an
ethico-aesthetic sense.1S
Kantianism, although it attempts some
universal formulations of the Categorical
Imperative, is nevertheless quite explicit in
its affirmation of the autonomy of the Practi-
cal Reason, i.e., it does not consider that law
is something imposed ab extra, even though
moral law does reach all men by its strict
obligation. How does Kant explain this?
Not, surely, because of any objective good
commonly sought by all men. For in Kant's
theory of human knowledge, the- only ob-
11 Encyclical letter of Pius X, Pascendi Dominici
gregis (1907).
12 Cf. KNOX, ENTHUSIASM 25-49 (1950).
18 Cf. PARENTE, DICTIONARY OF DOGMATIC THE-
OLOGY 131 (1951).
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jects after which man could strive would be
phenomena, i.e., sensuous good. Hence an
objectively motivated morality for Kant is
necessarily hedonistic and egotistical, i.e.,
not a morality at all. In this position, Kant
reveals his Puritanical and Pietistic leanings.
(It might be noted that God is not attained
by man as an object of knowledge, accord-
ing to Kant - not even in the Critique of
Practical Reason.)
Only one way is possible to safeguard
true morality, explains Immanuel Kant, and
that is by looking for the form of law, not
for its matter, which is sensuous. This form
is pure obligation, demanding of every
moral act a total disinterestedness on the
part of the agent: "duty done for duty's
sake." But the consciousness of such an
obligation, says Kant, is the basic fact of
moral life- the very form of moral con-
sciousness. This "fact" of the Practical
Reason is the Categorical Imperative itself.
It provides the command which must be the
unique and final goal of moral action:
"Come what may, do what should be done."
Kant's axiom: "Act in such a way that
your will could consider itself as making
universal laws by its maxims," indicates how
subjective and independent must be his sys-
tem of moral philosophy. Man's practical
reason finds itself the unique source of obli-
gation, fully exempt from any objective in-
fluence.14 The Kantian man would be no-
intruder in the dust of the situationalist
world.
Pragmatism, as expounded by John
Dewey, is no more than a cater-cousin to
Existentialism. They have some kinship in-
sofar as neither takes cognizance of natural
14 Cf. COLLINS, A HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPEAN
PHILOSOPHY 523 (1954).
law. 15 Whatever niay be the lamentable
errors of Pragmatism, it does hold the indi-
vidual "morally" responsible to norms of
ethical behavior emanating from outside
himself. These principles are the excres-
cences of the accepted mores of social insti-
tutions. For Dewey, morality has an
experimental quality.' 6 The social order is
the matrix of ethical theory - as societies
change, so must their ethical formulations.
Hence, the "good self" is, by definition, the
"social self." It is a rank humanitarianism
that evaluates moral ideals and ideas in
terms of growth.' 7 While this is assuredly
moral relativism, it is not a genuinely sub-
jective morality, since one who is faced with
a decision must solve his problem on the
basis of standards enunciated by his social
milieu. These standards operate, it should
be noted, as guides and schemata, rather
than as rules.
Existentialism
Pius XII has stated that the "new moral-
ity" is the offspring of Existentialism.' 8 This
paper is not the place, of course, to conduct
a tour through the labyrinthine ways of the
aberrant modern philosophy originally in-
spired by S6ren Kierkegaard, a religious
man, and developed along atheistic lines by
Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir at
the Cafr des deux Magots (The Coyfee-house
of the Two Baboons) on the Left Bank. But
it will be necessary, given the interdepen-
dence of Existentialism and Situation Eth-
ics, to scan the area where the former's
philosophical content impinges on morality
15 Cf. Palmer, The Natural Law and Pragmatism,
1 PROC. NATURAL L. INST. 30 (1949).
16 See DEWEY, THEORY OF VALUATION (1939);
DEWEY, ETHICS (1938).
17 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORALS 134-46 (1956)
(chapter on John Dewey).
18 44 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 416 (1952).
and produces the latter.
Kierkegaard rightly rejected the total "ob-
jectivity" of Hegel with its complete disre-
gard for the finite existent and the world of
contingent freedom. Hegelian Christianity,
Kierkegaard rightly recognized, is a contra-
diction in terms, since Hegel has no place
for the individual soul and its work in the
drama of salvation. But Kierkegaard's re-
action went to the opposite extreme. Hegel
was exclusively objective; Kierkegaard
rejects all objectivity. For Kierkegaard,
"subjectivity is truth" and "Christianity is
subjectivity."
Man's ethical effort is to become "sub-
jective," the Copenhagen thinker taught.
Man's first lesson is to learn that the indi-
vidual stands alone, since the only reality
with which the ethical deals is the individ-
ual's own reality. There are no objectively
valid standards by whiclr man is to act.
While he did not at all deny God (in fact,
his philosophy is replete with religious
thought), nevertheless this God (the Abso-
lute) does not demand actions of men
which can be styled "right" or "wrong."
Not, at least, once a man really grasps who
and what this God is.
The reason why there is no divine com-
mand, the observance or violation of which
would warrant the description "right" or
"wrong," is simply because there is a sus-
pension of the ethical when faith is achieved.
Faith is a refuge, not a persuasion. The re-
lationship between God and man is at its
highest when man annihilates himself before
God to the extent that man's individuality
is suspended from ethical-moral require-
ments. This state results in suffering; in
anguish, in the Christian sense of "sin."' 19
19 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORALS 281-86 (1956)
(chapter on S6ren Klerkegaard).
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Kierkegaard's central error in this field is
the setting off, as mutually opposed, the
world of "generality" (universal law) against
the world of the "Knight of the faith" - of
his unique (and unjustifiable by mere human
reason) witness. This, of course, suspends
the effect of ethics. In reality, universal law
and the individual are in continuity, we hold,
for both together comprise the universe of
ethics.20
Evidently, it is in fact impossible to draw
out any genuine ethical system from a phi-
losophy that is purely subjective. Kierke-
gaard admitted this when he painted the
ideal man as somehow beyond the need, or
the ability, to establish himself in relation
to any ethics.
Sartre has pretended not to be interested
in moral philosophy, although he admits
that ontology and ethics are somehow insep-
arable. 21 He has promised to coin a brand
of ethics; an inconsistent stand to take, but
nothing is really surprising which comes
from anything as tortured and double-talk-
ing as Existentialism.
Simone de Beauvoir, in Ethics of Am-
biguity,2 2 has attempted a formulation of
Existential ethics, thereby keeping a jump
ahead of her friend-of-long-standing, Sartre.
She admits that her school of philosophy is
individualistic, but she disavows any claim
that it leads to the anarchy of personal whim.
"Man is free," she writes, "but he finds his
law in his very freedom. ' 23 How Existential-
ism can help but lead to anarchy in the
moral order is not easily understood in the
light of her concluding words: "It is up to
20 See MARITAIN, EXISTENCE AND THE EXISTENT
65 (1956).
21 See JEANSON, LE PROBLEME MORALE ET LA
PENSEE DE SARTRE, passim (1947).
22 DE BEAUVOIR, ETHICS OF AMBIGUITY (1948).
28 Id. at 156.
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each one to fulfill his existence as an abso-
lute .... [A] ny man who has known real
loves, real revolts, real desires, and real will
knows quite well that he has no need of
any outside guarantee to be sure of his goals;
their certitude comes from his own drive." 24
According to this brand of Existentialism,
man's self is a not-being ("ndant"). "[M] an,
that being whose being is not to be."'2r, There-
fore, there can be no "human nature" nor
the traditional affirmations about man which
the acceptance of the concept "human na-
ture" entails. Essence is not a datum; it is
a goal of subjectivity toward which man
strives.
Along with the rejection of all essence,
Sartre rejects the ethical universal. Man is
free; so free that through his freedom he
creates his own essence, (i.e., the "essence"
of the Sartrean man); so free that he is "con-
demned to be free." Hence, all absolutes
must be denied inasmuch as they place limits
to liberty.
The notion of "value," maintains Existen-
tialism, is the consequence of man's constant
tendency to objectify his own strivings to
change his existence into being.20 Due to
this striving, man accords "values" objective
worth, as if they really existed outside of
man himself. Once humankind attains a gen-
eral sense of this "objectivization," men ad-
here to it in blindness. They find this easy
and convenient to do, says Existentialism,
precisely because freedom means anguish,
and by following already "established val-
ues" man escapes this anguish. Such a (slav-
ish) acceptance of norms results in a lack
of "authenticity."
24 Id. at 159.
25 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORALS 165 (1956)
(chapter on French Existentialism).
26 See DE BEAUVOIR, op. cit. supra note 22, at 14.
Any relationship of man to some abso-
lute, viz., God, annihilates man as a subject
by making him an object of Another. The
perfect liberty of the individual must be
constantly affirmed; man is freed by increas-
ing always his possibilities of choice. By
creating one's own values, one leads the
"authentic" life. Writes Simone de Beauvoir:
"Man will understand that it is not a matter
of being right in the eyes of God, but of
being right in his own eyes. Renouncing the
thought of seeking the guarantee for his
existence outside of himself, he will also
refuse to believe in unconditioned values
which would set themselves up athwart his
freedom .... "27
In a word, as Jacques Maritain expresses
it: "[T]hey [the Existentialists] have
thrown out reason and make the formal
element of morality consist in pure liberty
alone." 28
Gabriel Marcel, a French Catholic, has
made tentatives toward incorporating a phi-
losophy of existence, akin to Existentialism,
within the framework of his faith. Marcel
believes that the anguish experienced by
modern man is attributable to an excessive
"functionalization" of life which empties it
of its basic reality. Man feels a sense of
restlessness, uneasiness, emptiness, despair.
This sense (or temptation) should be a
passing thing, and it would pass if man
would recognize the emptiness of existence
through his experience of it. To fill this void
he must strive against alienation from him-
self and from his fellow men; this leads him
out of the way of despair into the realm of
hope. Not hope in the theological dimension
of the word, but an assertion that there is
27 Ibid.
28 MARITAIN, EXISTENCE AND THE EXISTENT 68
(1956).
at the heart of being a mysterious principle
which cannot but will that which man wills,
if what man wills deserves to be willed.29 It
is difficult to derive clear ethical indications
from Marcel. In his latest work, The Decline
of Wisdom, he has modified his previous
anti-universal, anti-essence position.3 0 With
reference to ethics, he writes: "In reflecting
on the ever-increasing aberrations in the
sphere of ethical and speculative thought...
I have found myself by reaction growing in-
creasingly aware of certain values which I
had spontaneously depreciated during the
formative years .... 31
Marcel still appears to believe that the
presentation of morality has been over-sys-
tematized and that this is a cause of much
moral confusion today. He does not like
what he calls a "codification of ethics," since
the Christian Existentialist does not hold for
an ethic that is theoretical, philosophical,
conceptual. He pleads for what he describes
as a "dynamic morality" as contrasted with
what he feels has become the form of Cath-
olic ethical teaching: an unduly-systematic
mold influenced by post-Cartesian rational-
ism and one which minimizes human experi-
ence.
32
The Reply to Errors
Said Pope Pius XII: "It is not difficult to
recognize how the new moral system derives
from Existentialism, which either prescinds
from God, or simply denies Him, and in
any case, leaves man to himself."'3 3 Man left
29 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORALS, op. cit. supra note
25, at 170.
30 MARCEL, THE DECLINE OF WISDOM at vii
(1955).
31 Ibid.
82 See Newman, The Ethics of Existentialism,
IRISH ECCL. RECORD 421-32 (1952).
33 44 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 416 (1952).
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to himself is no longer man, for as God is
intelligible only in terms of Himself, so man
is intelligible only in terms of his relation
to God. Through the very fact that this is
a created world, man's reason catches sight
of the power of God; of His wisdom; of His
providence, and concludes to transcendent
obligations: man has to obey the laws God
has impressed upon man's nature.
Existentialism has for its bate noire the
rational process. It is anti-intellectual, for
all its brilliant phosphorescence of decay. Its
method is to look to whatever is mysterious
and illogical in human living to find any ex-
planation of life. "The exploration of the
irrational," proclaims Sartre, "is the special
task of the 20th century. 3 4
The refusal to use the intellect, the sub-
stitution of emotion for the rational process
- these were linked to the denial of natural
law and objective morality by Archbishop
(now Cardinal) O'Hara in his address open-
ing the annual convention of the American
Bar Association just a few years ago.33
Nothing so pointedly reveals the split be-
tween Christian ethics and situation morality
as the former's ubiquitous insistence on
reason in relation to morals. "Reason is the
rule and measure of human acts; it is their
first principle," teaches St. Thomas. While
it is the rational appetite which produces
the moral act, it is, nevertheless, the reason-
ing intellect which provides the formal prin-
ciple of the moral modality of that act.36
Hence, the moral order is an order of rea-
son: the order of real beings governed in
their esse and in their operari by the eternal
and immutable law of God running through
the warp and woof of human nature. Natural
3 See Newman, supra note 32, at 321-32.
35 Our Sunday Visitor, Sept. 11, 1955, p. 6.
36 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-I, q. 90 art. 1.
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law, with its universal and timeless char-
acter, can be understood only in light of the
metaphysical nature of man; moral norms
are precisely the moral expression of an
objective reality: who and what man is. The
existential man is at the same time the essen-
tial man.
It is inescapably true that the funda-
mental duties of the universal moral law
have their binding force in the concrete (in
the case that "happens only once") precisely
because that law is universal. It includes,
necessarily and intentionally, all the indi-
vidual instances that may confront man.3 7
Evidently, the certitude with which one
acts in his correspondence to the exigencies
of the moral order is not always the same.
That is to say, the decision one must make
in a time of moral challenge appears with
special force when negative obligations are
in question. But it is not alone in circum-
stances where one must omit some action
that the force of the universal and natural
moral law asserts itself in the conscience of
man. It operates on the level of all essential
relationships of human life. This is so simply
because that moral law is ineluctably tied-in
with the very nature itself of man. The
Christian law, in the degree that it is superior
to the natural law, is based on the essence
of the supernatural order as established by
Christ.
In view of this twofold order in which
redeemed man lives and moves and has his
being, the Church holds unswervingly to
the essential evil of many acts. Directly to
quote Pope Pius XII:
From the essential relationships between
man and God, between man and man, be-
tween husband and wife, between parents
and children; from the essential community
s7 44 AcTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 417 (1952).
relationships found in the family, in the
Church and in the State, it follows (among
other things) that hatred of God, blas-
phemy, idolatry, abandoning the true faith,
denial of the faith, perjury, murder, bearing
false witness, calumny, adultery and forni-
cation, the abuse of marriage, the solitary
sin, stealing and robbery, taking away the
necessities of life, depriving workers of their
just wages, monopolizing vital foodstuffs
and unjustifiably increasing prices, fraudu-
lent bankruptcy, unjust maneuvering in
speculation - all these are gravely forbid-
den by the divine Lawmaker. No exam-
ination is necessary. No matter what the
situation of the individual may be, there is
no other course open to him but to obey.38
The metaphysical foundation of the natu-
ral law is the ontological truth of things, i.e.,
as they really are in their conformity to the
divine mind (God's essence). The essences
of all created things, and that includes the
moral order itself, are, therefore, not depen-
dent on things as they are in the existing
order. Rather, things in the existing order
are dependent on the exemplary ideas in
God. For this reason, the essential nature
of things is inalterable. From this stems the
immutability of the natural law and the
natural goodness (or badness) of certain
actions.
The obliging power of the natural law
does not rest on man's knowledge of God,
although that knowledge is relevant to the
discussion, but on the truth of things as they
are. The natural moral law does not pre-
suppose morality; it constitutes it through
its expression of the truth of things as they
are; this expression produces its activity in
man's reason. A good act is according to
right reason; a bad act is opposed to right
reason.
The exact meaning of recta ratio is dis-
puted. A satisfactory interpretation of its
88 Ibid.
meaning is this: man is formally perfected
by his rationality; he is specified by the
possessing of a reasoning intellect. This ratio
humana is the principle of rightness in his
voluntary acts. The more perfectly man acts
in accord with reason, the more perfect he
will be as man. In his acts of reasoning, end-
ing in right judgment, the intellect does not
work estranged from the real world about
one. Speculative reason achieves right judg-
ments when it is in conformity with the
existing nature of its real objects. The prac-
tical reason is rectified by the judgments of
the speculative reason, by which the real
order is primarily known. Accordingly, the
morality of an act is determined by the
consonance of practical reasoning with
speculative reasoning, not immediately by
comparison of the act with the nature of
things.39 Existing things regulate speculative
reason; speculative reason regulates prac-
tical reasoning.
If we stopped here, we should not have
carried the analysis to its full term: the
application of the natural law to the choice
of human acts. Ultimately, reason is recti-
fied, not by created and finite realities, but
by the ordering mind of God which submits
man, who participates in this eternal law, to
its dictates. In this way, man's elections and
the motions of his free will fall under Provi-
dence, to whose rule they are morally sub-
ject. 40 Pius XII drew the antithesis between
the demands of this natural moral law and
the pretenses of Situation Ethics when he
said in an allocution in March, 1952:
The Christian moral law is in the law of
the Creator, engraved in the heart of each
one, and in Revelation .... The first step
or rather the first attack against the struc-
8 9 BouRKE, ST. THOMAS AND THE GREEK MORAL-
ISTS 24 (1947) (published lecture).
4 0 AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, bk. III,
cc. 90, 140.
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ture of Christian moral norms would be
to free them from the narrow and oppres-
sive surveillance of the authority of the
Church. This would be done in such wise
that, once liberated from the sophistic sub-
tleties of the casuistic method, the moral
law might be brought back to its original
form, leaving it simply to the intelligence
and determination of each one's individual
conscience. 41
Any deliberate divergence between a judg-
ment of reason and the natural law is either
a formal sin or the product of an erroneous
conscience. 42 As the Pope declared in an
allocution on psychotherapy in April 1954,
there are instances where, through a faulty
conscience, wrong things are done which are
not necessarily imputable to the agent. But
even with regard to these acts, they are "in
contrast to the divine mode; they still run
counter to the ultimate finality of man's
being." These materially wrong acts are not
realities "indifferent in the moral order. 43
The Role of Prudence
Where there are no absolutely binding
standards, independent of all circumstances
(as there are such standards in the cases,
e.g., of abortion, blasphemy, denial of the
faith, etc.), there is often need to weigh
carefully the circumstances of the unique
instance in order to decide what moral rules
are to be applied and how. Catholic moral
philosophy has always and extensively
treated the problem of the formation of con-
science, especially through the cultivation
of the cardinal virtue of prudence. Catholic
theologians and philosophers have given
adequate study to the question of personal
4144 ACTA APOSTOLCAE SEDIs 272-73 (1952).
42 See Fuchs, Situation Ethics and Theology, 2
THEOLOGY DIGEST 25-30 (1954).
43 See 2 UNWEARIED ADVOCATE 151 (Yzermans
ed. 1956).
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activity and of the response to actuality.
The good moral act, we know, is some-
thing in conformity with right reason under
the aegis of prudence, the recta ratio agibil-
ium. The supreme importance of prudence
in the solution of moral problems, in cases
where tle logical mode of action is not im-
mediately apparent, is underscored by the
words of Pius XII: "St. Thomas' treatment
of the virtue of prudence... contains what-
ever is true and positive in Situation Ethics,
while avoiding its deviations from the truth
and its confusion. It will suffice, therefore,
if the modern moralist, desirous of penetrat-
ing the new problems, will follow along the
same lines." 44
The pertinence of this remark of the Pope
is manifest when we observe the stress
placed by St. Thomas on the concrete qual-
ity of the function of prudence in moral
choices. He writes: "The practical reason
must be perfected by some habit, so that
it may judge rightly concerning human good
in regard to singular actions. This virtue is
called prudence, and its subject is the prac-
tical reason... the rightness and fulfillment
of goodness in all the other virtues arise
from prudence. '45
It is in the area of human moral activity
which is neither perfectly black nor perfectly
white, but rather gray, that prudence enables
one to reach a felicitous (or as felicitous as
may be) decision. It is in the area of selec-
tion of one good from among apparently
opposed goods; or of selection of a greater
good from among other goods; or a selection
of simply a good from among a variety of
possible evils, that prudence is most indis-
pensable to man. When the case is a clear-
cut application of moral logic, as occurs in
44 44 AcrA APOSTOLICAn SEDIs 418 (1952).
45 AQUINAS, DE VIRTUTIBUS IN COMMUNI, art. 6.
the examples already mentioned, there is not
much work for prudence.
"What must I really do?" is the practical
question that asserts itself in the soul of a
man of good will faced by a diversity of ap-
parently conflicting duties, to be satisfied,
he hopes, through the instrumentality of per-
haps multiple rules. Choices might arise, for
example, concerning: membership in a par-
ticular union; a conflict between filial duty to
one's family and the demands of patriotism;
the employment of certain types of drugs or
surgery; the problems of youth in dating; the
risks allowed in some kinds of hazardous
recreation; business dealings that give rise
to delicate questions of finance; political
maneuvering; the stand to be taken by a
Christian statesman when aid to a commu-
nist government is proposed; intricate racial-
relation issues; acts of censorship - these
and countless other situations call for the
prudential judgment of a properly formed
conscience.
Catholic teaching has always stressed the
formation of the conscience and the need
to examine the circumstances in a case to
be decided. This is not to neglect personality
values nor to strangle initiative. Sound edu-
cation is directed, in a very real sense, at
freeing one from the necessity always to turn
to a teacher at every step in one's moral life.
Within proper limits, the educated man
must be independent; mature; self-reliant. 46
Above all, he must be prudent.
Prudence it is which carves the way of
reason through this often miasmic world:
man must observe; he must judge; he must
act. These acts of prudence are essential to
the good life because of the infinite variety
of means which free men use in their pursuit
of the goals of reason. The virtue of pru-
46 44 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDis 418 (1952).
dence accomplishes right things in the right
way; it orients the powers of the practical
intellect; it makes tactical decisions in life's
battle. A prudent man may indeed make
wrong decisions, but not nearly so many
and not nearly so wrong ones as will the
imprudent man. Prudence does not relieve
anyone of the need to take calculated risks
in his mortal pilgrimage; perfect certitude
cannot be always ours. A just God does not
demand that we refrain from action until
we have supra-human certitude. 47
It is the role of prudence to assure us of
the reasonable safety of our application of
general principles. Obviously, for example,
a man acts immorally if he drives recklessly,
but it is the duty of the virtue of prudence
to decide what kind of driving is not reckless.
Prudence and the Concrete Act
The uniqueness of an individual case is
never incompatible with general princi-
ples.4 8 Christian moral philosophy is specu-
lative in its mode, but practical by reason of
its object: moral conduct.4 9 The qualifica-
tion "moral" inevitably introduces the ques-
tion of voluntariness.
A man is good or bad from his will; the
acts of his practical judgment are truly good
or bad dependent upon the actual condition
of the rational appetite in relation to the
ends of the agent. We Christians are pro-
foundly interested in the acts which free men
bring into existence through the exercise of
their liberty. We appreciate the "creative"
importance of these acts as well as the
uniqueness of the moment, and its vastly
47 3 FARRELL, A COMPANION TO THE SUMMA
144-57 (1940).
48 44 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 417 (1952).
4 9 MARITAIN, EXISTENCE AND THE EXISTENT 56
(1956).
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ramified context. We also acknowledge the
totally intrinsic freedom of the will which
elicits or commands human actions. In these
matters, we'll go along with Existentialism
wherein there is found some good and some
truth. We readily admit that it is a problem
of notable importance to establish a mean-
ingful contact between the objective norms
of ,morality and the concrete circumstances
confronting man. We have never denied
that account must be taken of circumstances,
but we do deny that the circumstances are
all that matters; or that sincerity is all that
matters. God does want, first and always, a
right intention. But that is not enough. He
also wants a good work. Further, there may
be situations in which a man, and especially
a Christian, cannot ignore his duty to sacri-
fice everything, including his life, for the
attainment of his own ultimate good: the
salvation of his soul.50 A moral philosophy
really apt as a guide to action is incompre-
hensible if it fails to take into its calculations
the existential state of humanity, i.e., under
the burden of Original Sin but aided by
grace, the virtues, the Gifts of the Holy
Spirit. Situation Ethics does not merely dog-
matize against nature; it also denies super-
nature. It appraises life with an a priori
conviction that life is absurd, without effi-
cient causality and without finality. Situation
Ethics is blind because it has neither faith
nor prudence; it despairs because it has no
hope; it is heartless because it excludes
charity.
Dominating the entire field of any discus-
sion of the virtue of prudence is the question
of the moral conscience and the manner in
which, at the core of concrete existence, the
will enters into the picture of reason's regu-
lation of the moral act. Under this aspect,
5044 AcrA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 418 (1952).
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the rectitude of the intellect depends upon
the rectitude of the will because of the prac-
tical (not speculative) existentiality of the
concrete moral judgment. Not only is the
truth of the practical intellect in conformity
with a rightly ordered will inasmuch as the
end of the practical intellect is to operate in
the production of a good free act, but also
because the act of moral choice is so indi-
vidualized, through the individuality of the
agent and the individuality of the context of
contingent circumstances, that the practical
judgment which expresses the moral choice
can be hic et nunc right only if the dynamism
of man's willing is right, i.e., is tending
toward the genuine good of human life.
That is why prudence, wisdom in act, is
a virtue that establishes a modality both in
the intellect and in the will. The practical
quality of prudence - its concern with the
right positing of this act now to be per-
formed- is the reason why it cannot be
supplanted by any kind of speculative
knowledge. Exactly the same moral instance
never happens twice; there will always be
some differences that require individual eval-
uation. Each moral choice brings into exis-
tence a unique act, and this act must itself
conform to the moral law. Texts and codes
give universal rules we are obliged to apply,
but they don't tell you or me how we shall,
in this unique act we are about to do, apply
them.
As Maritain so clearly demonstrates,
"No knowledge of moral essences, however
perfect, meticulous, or detailed it may be
and however particularised those essences
may be (though they will always remain
general); no casuistry, no chain of pure
deduction, no science, can exempt me from
my judgment of conscience, and, if I have
some virtue, from the exercise of the virtue
of prudence, in which exercise it is the rec-
titude of my willing that has to effect the
accuracy of my vision."5' 1
In this way, the factual data of a moral
situation are informed, so to speak, by the
working-over given them by conscience and
prudence and charity. The circumstances of
the situation represent God's claim on the
man whom they confront, and in this sense,
man's encounter with God is not immediate;
it is mediate. Thus we may say that the
ontological reality of the situation reveals
God's will to us, and we must resolve the
demands placed upon us by this situation
through the personalized application of ob-
jective principles.
But these objective principles of universal
moral law cannot be properly applied unless
they are embodied in the ends which actu-
ally attract my desire and in the actual
movement of my will toward a good. I must
recognize in objective norms, by a process
of reflection, however swift it may be, an
urgent demand of my individual and per-
sonal desire for the very ends upon which
I have made my life depend. If I do not so
regard these norms, then I shall not do good.
This is what Maritain calls the "interioriza-
tion of the universal law." Objective motives
are vitally referred to the inner world of
man, many elements of which inner world
are simply not susceptible of personal con-
ceptual analysis. The most prudent decision
may seem mysterious even to the man who
makes it, almost as if it were irrational, in-
explicable. The dictum of Pascal: "The
heart has reasons which reason does not
comprehend," can, if stripped of its senti-
mental, anti-intellectual overtones, be ap-
plied to the radar-functioning of prudence,
particularly when prudence is considered as
an infused virtue.
51 MARtrAtN, op. cit. supra note 49, at 60.
Implementation of the moral law is, in
this supposition, not merely a logical proc-
ess by which just somebody neatly catalogs
a particular case under a universal law. It is
my fear of doing something contrary to my
deepest need; it is my conscience that has
to answer. I align myself, unique as I am and
finding myself in this unique situation, with
the abstract and generalized "man," with
"a person" subject to the universal moral
law. In every authentically moral act, man,
in order to apply and in applying the law,
must embody and grasp the universal in his
own singular existence.
The exponents of situation morality, by
rejecting the ethical universal along with all
essence, show that they feel that if there
were a system of moral values, the rules of
it would apply automatically and of them-
selves. They think that the morality of Chris-
tian moralists exempts one from the work of
conscience by supplying a catalog of pat
formulas to supplant the deeply personal,
and often painfully worked out, decisions of
conscience. They suppose that our morality
offers a substitute for the judgments of pru-
dence.
Conclusion
No Christian evaluation of an ethical
question can omit an explicit inclusion of
the meaning of the Incarnation and Re-
demption to mankind. Christianity does
change the significance of our being when
we realize that the Transcendent One has
anointed our nature with His divinity. We
are contingent creatures to whom human
nature is owed but to whom the limitless
life of God is somehow freely communi-
cated. Our being escapes the circle of natural
fate; it is anagogical, sacramentalized.
We believe that man's perfection consists
in charity, and that all are bound to tend
toward the perfection of love. Any adequate
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understanding of morality necessarily circles
about those things which are most existen-
tial. Mutual benevolence and the exigencies
that it places upon a finite lover do not deal
with what is merely possible or what is
merely an essence. There may be such a
thing as Platonic love, but love itself is surely
not something Platonic. It is concerned with
existents: with persons - divine, angelic,
human.
Writes Joseph de Finance, S.J., in his
acute examination of the Thomistic concept
of objectivity-subjectivity:
Love directs itself towards the other ac-
cording to the latter's own proper existence;
it takes up on its own account and prolongs
within itself the act by which the other
inserts itself in the order of existence ...
The deepest relationship between beings
and God is not one of resemblance or of
difference * . . It is rather an "existential"
relationship, and therefore one that is
strictly speaking impossible to define. One
can do no more than evoke it by sugges-
tion,' as that act by which beings are both
made present and present themselves before
God, and thus at once are distinguished
from Him and turn towards Him, adhering
to Him as to the Source on which they
depend. 52
This is not the place to relate the so-called
"new approach to moral theology" to Situ-
ation Ethics. It will suffice to note that it
urges a more positive interpretation of man's
moral duties, based upon increased atten-
tion to the moral and theological virtues,
especially to the virtue of charity. Writes
Gerard Gilleman, S.J.: "A moral theology
which would succeed in separating the
moral act from a consideration of man's
final end (and hence would neglect charity),
would be performing an autopsy and not
2 de Finance, Being and Subjectivity, DOCTOR
CoMMuNIs 240-58 (1948) [reprinted in 6 CROSS
CtURRENTS 163-78 (Spring 1956)].
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practicing a science of the living."53
Because man's destiny is not a natural
one, God has given him means proportioned
to his end. That means is the supernatural
organism of grace and its concomitants.
Without this, life would be indeed absurd.
Wrote Fydor Dostoyevsky in The Brothers
Karamazov: "On earth indeed, we are as it
were astray, and if it were not for the pre-
cious image of Christ before us, we should
be undone and altogether lost."
53 Gilleman, Moral Theology and Charity, 2 :THE-
OLOGY DIGEST 18 (1954).
As Raskolnikov discovered, in Crime and
Punishment, all men have to obey the moral
law. Those who embrace Situation Ethics
as a way of life will learn, sooner or later,
as did Raskolnikov, that such a false inter-
pretation of liberty leads freedom to degen-
erate into self-will - "the suicide of man by
self-affirmation." There can be but one gen-
uine liberty for men: the acceptance of
God's supreme role in human affairs, both
in the intellectual order and in the order of
the will. "You shall know the truth - and
the truth shall make you free."
